We investigate the computational complexity of deciding whether a given inference rule is admissible for some modal and superintuitionistic logics. We state a broad condition under which the admissibility problem is coNEXP -hard. We also show that admissibility in several well-known systems (including GL, S4, and IPC ) is in coNE , thus obtaining a sharp complexity estimate for admissibility in these systems.
Introduction
Computational complexity of derivability in modal and superintuitionistic logics is a wellestablished subject. Kuznetsov [15] studied complexity of s.i. logics, and posed the problem whether IPC is coNP -complete. Ladner [16] showed that the modal systems K, T , and S4 are PSPACE -complete, whereas S5 is in coNP . Statman [20] refuted Kuznetsov's conjecture, by showing PSPACE -completeness of IPC , and even of its implicational fragment. Since then similar results were obtained for a variety of modal and s.i. logics, see e.g. Chagrov [3] and Spaan [19] ; the bottom line is that PSPACE is the "typical" complexity of modal and s.i. logics with unbounded width and depth.
In contrast, the complexity of admissibility in non-classical logics is mostly unknown. An inference rule ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k ψ is admissible in a logic L, if the set of theorems of L is closed under the rule. Friedman [7] asked whether admissibility in intuitionistic logic is decidable. The problem was extensively studied in the 80's and 90's in a series of papers by Rybakov, later summarized in the book [18] . Among other deep results on properties of sets of admissible rules and their bases, * The research was done while the author was visiting the Department of Philosophy of the Utrecht University. Supported by grant IAA1019401 of GA AVČR.
Rybakov showed decidability of admissibility in many modal and s.i. logics (thus answering positively Friedman's question). Chagrov [4] constructed a decidable modal logic, which has undecidable admissibility problem. The work of Ghilardi on unification in intuitionistic and modal logics [8, 9] provided an important characterization of admissibility in terms of projective formulas, and new decision procedures for admissibility in some modal and s.i. systems. Ghilardi's results were utilized by Iemhoff [11, 12, 13] to construct an explicit basis of admissible rules for IPC and some other s.i. logics, and to develop Kripke semantics for admissible rules. These results were extended to modal logics by Jeřábek [14] . The study of algorithmic aspects of admissibility thus so far concentrated on the question of decidability. The complexity of some of the known decision procedures for admissibility is indicated in the literature, and we may compute estimates for the other ones with little effort. Namely, Rybakov (see [18] ) gives a decision procedure for admissibility of reduced rules in K4, GL, S4, S4Grz , and IPC , which is easily seen to be implementable in Π P 2 . Admissibility of non-reduced rules in these systems is thus decidable in Π E 2 = coNE NP . Ghilardi [10] found a remarkably elegant algorithm for constructing projective approximations (and thus testing admissibility) in IPC , which appears more useful in practice, but makes a worse bound for theoretical purposes: exponential space. As we will see, these upper bounds turn out to be mostly suboptimal. More importantly, as far as the author is aware, no nontrivial lower bounds were known for the admissibility problem, except for Chagrov's example. Our aim is to fill this gap by showing that admissibility in "typical" normal extensions of K4 and s.i. logics is coNEXP -complete (and in particular, strictly more complex than the derivability problem, under reasonable complexity-theoretic assumptions). On one hand, we modify our algorithm from [14] to obtain a coNEXP (in fact, coNE ) decision procedure for admissibility in a class of logics including K4, GL, S4, S4Grz , and IPC . On the other hand, we show that admissibility is coNEXP -hard in all s.i. logics L contained in BD 3 (i.e., every depth-3 tree is an L-frame), and in normal extensions of K4 meeting a similar requirement.
Preliminaries
We assume the reader is familiar with basics of the theory of modal and superintuitionistic (s.i.) logics; we refer the reader to [5] or [1] for concepts unexplained here. We also assume rudimentary complexity theory (definitions of complexity classes such as the polynomial hierarchy, PSPACE , NE , and NEXP ; consult e.g. [17] ). Our results (especially the upper bounds) depend heavily on [11] and [14] ; we summarize the relevant definitions and results below.
All Kripke frames are assumed to be transitive. Usually we will denote the accessibility relation by the ordering symbol <, in which case ≤ is its reflexivization: x ≤ y iff x = y or x < y. (If the frame is already reflexive, we thus have < = ≤.) The symbols n ϕ, ϕ, ♦ϕ, and · ♦ϕ abbreviate · · · n ϕ, ϕ ∧ ϕ, ¬ ¬ϕ, and ¬ ¬ϕ, respectively.
Some modal axioms, and their corresponding conditions on finite transitive Kripke frames, are listed in table 1. We let K be the minimal normal modal logic, GL = K ⊕ (GL), and S4 = K ⊕ (4) ⊕ (T ); names of other modal logics will be formed by concatenation of the name symbol axiom frame condition (4) ϕ Let L be a normal modal or superintuitionistic logic. A multiple-conclusion rule consists of two finite sets of formulas
Such a rule is L-admissible, which we write as
(In the modal case, derivation from a set of assumptions allows the necessitation rule, thus ϕ L ϕ.) A rule system over L is a set A of rules (written in a sequent form Γ ∆, where Γ and ∆ are finite sets of formulas), which is closed under cut, and includes all L-derivable rules. By abuse of language, we identify L with the minimal rule system over L. The set of all L-admissible multiple-conclusion rules forms a rule system, which we denote A L .
A quasi-normal modal logic is an extension of K closed under substitution and detachment. Let L be a normal extension of K4. The characteristic formula of a rule Γ ∆ is
If A is a rule system over L, we let A denote the quasi-normal extension of K4 axiomatized by characteristic formulas of all rules from A. In this way, we embed rule systems in quasinormal logics; the following observation ensures the embedding is faithful.
Lemma 1.1 ([14])
A is conservative over A, i.e., a sequent Γ ∆ is provable in A if and only if its characteristic formula is provable in A .
In particular, the study of L-admissible rules is subsumed by the study of A L . Also notice that the logic of the minimal rule system, L = K4 + { ϕ; L ϕ}, is normal. It has the following semantical characterization.
Lemma 1.2 ([14]
) Let L be a Kripke complete normal extension of K4. Then L is sound and complete with respect to the class of transitive rooted frames K, <, r such that r is irreflexive, and K {r} is an L-frame. If L has the finite model property, then L has FMP as well.
Let L be a normal extension of K4 with FMP. L is reflexive, if all L-frames are reflexive (i.e., L ⊇ S4), and it is irreflexive if all L-frames are irreflexive (i.e., L ⊇ GL). L is linear if all rooted L-frames are linear (i.e., L ⊇ K4.3). If K i , i < n are frames, then i<n K i is their disjoint sum. If K is a frame, then K • (K • ) is the frame constructed from K by attaching a new reflexive (irreflexive) root below K. L is extensible, if for every finite sequence of finite L-frames K i , i < n, we have
L is linear extensible, if it is linear, and satisfies the extensibility condition above for n ≤ 1.
We introduce the following rule systems:
where n, m ∈ ω. Let A •,1 and A •,1 be the restrictions of A • and A • to n ≤ 1. The main theorem of [14] was the following description of admissible rules of extensible and linearly extensible modal logics. Let K, < be an L-frame. A point x is an irreflexive tight predecessor of a finite set of points {y i ; i < n}, if for every z ∈ K, z > x iff ∃i z ≥ y i .
x is a reflexive tight predecessor of {y i ; i < n}, if for every z ∈ K,
An L-frame K, < is extensible (resp., linearly extensible), provided the generated submodels K x are finite for every x ∈ K, and every finite subset of K (resp., every subset of size at most 1) has a reflexive tight predecessor unless L is irreflexive, and an irreflexive tight predecessor unless L is reflexive.
Notice that an irreflexive tight predecessor may actually be a reflexive point: specifically, if y is reflexive, than y itself is both a reflexive t.p. and an irreflexive t.p. of {y}. We deviated from the definition in [14] in this respect 1 .
1 More precisely, from its intended meaning; the definition of tight predecessors as it stands in [14] is erroneous.
Let L be an extensible logic, and ϕ a formula. We define R L ϕ as the conjunction of the formulas of the form
if L is not reflexive, and
if L is not irreflexive, where ϕ j and ψ i are subformulas of ϕ. Similarly, if L is a linear extensible logic, we let R L ϕ be the conjunction of
for L not reflexive, and
for L not irreflexive, where ϕ j and ψ i are subformulas of ϕ. Notice that in both cases, R L ϕ is (a simple variant of) a conjunction of axioms of A L . We have the following semantical characterization of A L (and thus, of L-admissibility).
Theorem 1.4 ([14])
If L is an extensible (linear extensible) modal logic, and ϕ a formula, the following are equivalent.
(iii ) ϕ holds in the root of every L -frame K, <, r such that K {r} is extensible (resp., linearly extensible).
In particular, the formulas R L ϕ hold in the root of every L -frame K such that K {r} is (linearly) extensible.
Earlier, R. Iemhoff [11] characterized the admissible rules of IPC . The main results (reformulated for multiple-conclusion rules) are as follows.
together with the rule ⊥ form a basis of IPC -admissible rules.
An intuitionistic frame K is extensible, if every finite subset of K has a reflexive tight predecessor.
Theorem 1.6 ([11])
A rule Γ ∆ is IPC -admissible if and only if every extensible model which satisfies Γ also satisfies some formula ψ ∈ ∆.
A frame K , < is a subframe of a Kripke frame K, < , if K is a subset of K, and < is the restriction of < to K . K is a cofinal subframe if additionally
holds for every x, y ∈ K. A normal extension of K4 is a subframe (SF ) logic, if it is complete with respect to a class of Kripke frames closed under subframes, and it is a cofinal subframe (CSF ) logic, if it is complete with respect to a class of Kripke 2 frames closed under cofinal subframes. All cofinal subframe logics have the finite model property (Zakharyaschev [21] , cf. [5] ). CSF includes the vast majority of transitive logics used in practice: for example, logics axiomatized by combinations of the axioms listed in table 1 are CSF (in fact, SF, with the exception of (.1)).
If K is a frame, the depth d(x) of a point x ∈ K is the maximal natural number n such that there exists a sequence
The depth of a frame K is sup{d(x); x ∈ K}. The s.i. logic BD n is defined as the set of formulas valid in all Kripke frames of depth at most n.
Upper bounds
In this section we aim to show that admissibility in some of the best-known transitive logics is decidable in coNEXP . We will use a modification of an exponential-space algorithm for admissibility described in Jeřábek [14] . The main idea is to show that the formulas R L ϕ → ϕ have a kind of exponential model property. Notice that this is nontrivial: in our logics a formula may have only models of exponential size, and the length of R L ϕ → ϕ is itself exponential in the length of ϕ, thus a priori it could require models of doubly exponential size.
We stress that we are only concerned about the theoretical complexity of admissibility. For practical purposes, our algorithm is no better than the earlier exponential-space and doubly-exponential time algorithms, as non-deterministic Turing machines do not exist in the real world. In particular, the algorithm of Ghilardi [10] is likely far more efficient in practice.
be a finite model, K its submodel, and S a set of formulas. The submodel K is S-faithful, if
where n is the length of ϕ.
Proof: As CSF logics have the finite model property, there exists a finite rooted L -model K, <, r, such that r R L ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ. Let S be the set of subformulas of ϕ, and B the set of formulas β such that β is a subformula of R L ϕ . For any β ∈ B such that r β, we pick x β ∈ K such that x β β. By the proof of theorem 4.3 in Zakharyaschev [21] , there exists an S-faithful submodel K β ⊆ K of size 2 O(n) such that x β ∈ K β . Let K be the union of all K β and {r}. As |B| = 2 O(n) , we have |K | = 2 O(n) . The model K is S-faithful, and as all formulas from B are Boolean combinations of formulas from S, it is also B-faithful. It follows that K and K agree on satisfaction of boxed subformulas of R L ϕ (and ϕ) in r, thus
If L is only CSF, we have to modify K further. For any cluster C, let v(C) = {ψ; ψ ∈ S, x ψ}, where x ∈ C (the definition is independent on the choice of x). Let X be the set of all final clusters C ⊆ K such that C ∩ K = ∅. We consider the following equivalence relation on X:
, and either both C and D are reflexive, or both are irreflexive. Notice that ∼ has at most 2 n equivalence classes. Let Y be a selector for ∼, and for every C ∈ Y , we pick a subset C ⊆ C of size at most n such that for every ψ ∈ v(C), there exists an x ∈ C such that x ψ. We put K = K ∪ C∈Y C , and
It is easy to see that satisfaction of subformulas of ϕ is still preserved in K , ≺, r, , thus r R L ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ in K by the same argument as above. The size of K is 2 O(n) , and K is an L -frame, as K {r}, ≺ is a p-morphic image of a cofinal subframe of K {r}, < .
Theorem 2.3
If L is an extensible finitely axiomatizable CSF logic, then A L (and thus Ladmissibility of multiple-conclusion rules) is decidable in coNE . The same holds for admissibility in IPC .
Proof: Notice that it is decidable in polynomial time (in fact, in uniform AC 0 ) whether a finite Kripke frame is an L-frame, because CSF logics are elementary on finite frames [21] .
To check that A L ϕ, guess an exponential-size rooted model K, <, r, together with valuation of all subformulas of ϕ, and verify that the valuation satisfies the usual inductive definition, r R L ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ, and K {r}, < is an L-frame. Gödel's translation of any s.i. logic in its largest modal companion is faithful wrt admissible rules (Rybakov, see [18] ). (Alternatively, in the case of IPC , it also follows from theorems 1.6 and 1.4.) Example 2.4 Admissibility in K4, GL, S4, K4Grz , S4Grz , K4.1, or S4.1 is in coNE .
As noted in [14] , admissibility in normal extensions of GL.3 or S4.3 is coNP -complete. We expand this result to some other linear modal logics, including K4.3, K4Grz .3, and K4.1.3.
Lemma 2.5 Let L be a CSF linear extensible logic, which does not contain
Proof: Let S be the set of subformulas of ϕ, and we call a point x ϕ-reflexive if x ψ implies x ψ for every ψ ∈ S. We take a linearly extensible L -model K, <, r, such that r ϕ.
First we find a polynomial-size submodel X 0 ⊆ K − = K {r} such that X 0 contains a dead end and a simple reflexive final cluster (i.e., t.p.'s of the empty set), X 0 ∪ {r} is an S-faithful submodel of K, and X 0 hits every final cluster which is above a point of X 0 . We can construct X 0 as follows. We pick a dead end x • ∈ K − , and a simple reflexive final point
ω ∈ S and z ψ,χ ω, then z ψ,χ < z ψ,ω ω by linearity and the choice of z ψ,ω . This implies that X 0 ⊆ K − is S-faithful, and the other properties of X 0 are obvious.
We define a sequence X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n of subsets of K − as follows: for any x ∈ X i which is not ϕ-reflexive, we pick a reflexive and an irreflexive t.p. of {x} in K − , and put them in X i+1 . Notice that |X i+2 | ≤ |X i+1 | as reflexive points are ϕ-reflexive, therefore
. We claim that X n = ∅. If not, then by the construction there exists a chain x n < x n−1 < · · · < x 1 < x 0 such that x i ∈ X i , and x i+1 is an irreflexive t.p. of x i . A formula of the form ψ → ψ can fail in at most one point of a chain. As |{ψ; ψ ∈ S}| < n, the pigeonhole principle implies that x i is ϕ-reflexive for some i < n, contradicting the definition of X i+1 .
We put K = {r} ∪ i<n X i . We have |K | = O(n 3 ), and K is an L -model, as K {r} is a cofinal submodel of K − . It is easy to see that K is an S-faithful submodel of K, in particular r ϕ in K . We claim that r R L ϕ in K . Consider for instance the formula
where ϕ j and ψ i are subformulas of ϕ. Assume that r ( j<m ϕ j → i<n ψ i ), and fix x > r such that x j<m ϕ j ∧ i<n ¬ ψ i . If x is not ϕ-reflexive, there exists an irreflexive t.p. y > r of {x} by the construction, and clearly y j<m ϕ j ∧ i<n ¬ ψ i . If x is ϕ-reflexive, then trivially x j<m ϕ j , and by ϕ-reflexivity x i<n ¬ ψ i . In both cases r ( j<m ϕ j → i<n ψ i ). The other conjuncts of R L ϕ can be verified in a similar way.
Theorem 2.6 For any finitely axiomatizable linear extensible CSF logic L, admissibility and A L are coNP -complete.
Proof: We may assume that L does not contain S4 or GL. We proceed similarly to the proof of theorem 2.3. If we guess a polynomial-size model of ¬ϕ and verify it satisfies R L ϕ , we only get a Π P 2 -algorithm, as checking the exponential-size formula R L ϕ consumes a quantifier.
However, the proof of lemma 2.5 shows that we can assume the model to satisfy a stronger condition: every x > r which is not ϕ-reflexive has a reflexive and an irreflexive t.p. This condition is checkable in polynomial time.
The usefulness of the next example will become clear later.
there is an A L -model K of ¬ϕ with O(n 2 ) leaves: take an arbitrary countermodel for ϕ, extract its polynomial-size submodel faithful wrt subformulas of ϕ, and augment it with all the missing tight predecessors (which will all have depth 2).
Existence of such a model is checkable in Σ P 3 as follows. Find (first quantifier, ∃) a polynomial-size model K, r of depth 3 such that r ϕ. For any nonempty set X of leaves of K (second quantifier, ∀), guess (third quantifier, ∃) a valuation of atoms in an imaginary tight predecessor x of X, and verify the choice does not mess up satisfaction of subformulas of ϕ in r (i.e., for every boxed subformula ψ of ϕ, if r ψ in K, then x ψ).
Lower bounds
We are going to show that admissibility in a rich class of s.i. and modal logics is coNEXP -hard. We start by isolating a convenient coNEXP -complete problem, which we will then reduce to admissibility.
Lemma 3.1
The following problem is NEXP -complete. Given a number n in unary, and a sentence Φ, determine whether Φ holds in the n-element structure (with no predicates or functions), where Φ is a Σ 2 1 -formula of the form
X is a monadic third-order variable, a j are monadic second-order variables, i j are (firstorder ) constants from the structure, and ϕ is open.
Proof: Let L be an NEXP -language. Identify a binary string w with the structure n, <, W , where n = |w|, and W is the unary predicate such that W (j) iff w j = 1. Standard encoding of Turing machine computationsà la Fagin's theorem [6] gives a Σ 2 1 -formula Φ such that w ∈ L iff w Φ for every w. By usual quantifier switching tricks, any Σ 2 1 -formula is equivalent to a formula of the form ∃ X ∀ a ϕ, where X, a, and ϕ are third, second, and first order, respectively. By padding with unused places, we may also assume all X and a to have the same arity. Let w be given. We can tranform ϕ into a polynomial-size quantifier-free formula using constants from n instead of the relations <, W . By switching from n to n = n d and adjusting the atomic subformulas of ϕ, we may assume that a are monadic. (Notice that the quantifier prefix is still constant at this point.) Assume that the existential prefix consists of d quantifiers ∃X j of arity c. We can encode these d c-ary relations on subsets of n by a single unary predicate on subsets of n = cn +|d| so that (in a sloppy notation) X j (a 1 , . . . , a c )  iff X( a 1 , . . . , a k , j ) . We thus enlarge the structure once again from n to n , and replace the existential prefix with a single monadic quantifier. We retain the old quantifiers ∀a j (which now range over subsets of n , representing the old subsets of n by, say, the first n coordinates), and for each atomic formula of ϕ of the form X j ( a), include a new quantifier ∀b in the formula. In ϕ, replace X j ( a) with X(b), and include conditions (FO, rewritten as polynomial-size open) ensuring that b is correctly formed from a and j.
The next theorem is a special case of theorem 3.13. We nevertheless prefer to include its proof separately, as it explains the intuition behind the construction used in the general case, without the complications necessary to deal with reflexive models and weaker expressive power of intuitionistic logic.
Theorem 3.2 Admissibility in GL + 3 ⊥ and GL is coNEXP -hard.
Proof: Let L = GL + 3 ⊥. Assume we are given n, and a formula Φ = ∃X ∀a 0 . . . ∀a k−1 ϕ(. . . , a j ∈ X, . . . , i ∈ a j , . . .) as in lemma 3.1, we will construct a formula Φ such that
We define Φ as the conjunction of the following formulas in variables p i (i < n), q j (j < k), and t:
where ϕ is the formula ϕ(. . . , ♦(t ∧ ♦q j ), . . . , ♦(♦p i ∧ ♦q j ), . . .).
(Notice that ¬Φ is a characteristic formula of a single-conclusion inference rule, thus we indeed reduce the problem to L-admissibility rather than full A L .) Recall from [14] that A L is sound and complete wrt rooted GL-models K, r of depth 4, such that every finite subset X ⊆ K of depth at most 2 has a tight predecessor in K {r}. (Caveat lector: definition of depth used in [14] is off by one from the present one.)
The idea is as follows. At depth 1, we have names for each element of n, distinguished by the variables p i . A subset a ⊆ n is represented by a depth-2 point, having the names for the elements of a as its depth-1 successors. We use the variable t to indicate whether a ∈ X or not; the fourth conjunct of Φ ensures that the answer does not depend on the choice of the representant for a. The situation is however more complicated as ϕ involves a sequence of sets a 0 , . . . , a k−1 . To this end, we also have indices j < k at depth 1 using atoms q j , and each a ⊆ n has several representants at depth 2, labelled by j < k. Then we can read off the value of ϕ(X, a) at a point which has as its successors the representants of a 0 , . . . , a k−1 with the corresponding labels. (The premise of the last conjunct of Φ reads "for each j, I see a unique set labelled by j".) The important point is that existence of tight predecessors ensures any set has a representant with any label, thus we do not miss any instances of the universal quantifiers in Φ. We proceed with the formal details.
Assume that n Φ, and fix a witness X ⊆ P(n) to the existential quantifier. We construct a model K, r as follows. Take n + k points of depth 1, and attach all required tight predecessors, and the root r. Define valuation of variables so that each p i or q j is satisfied in one point of depth 1 and nowhere else, with distinct variables getting distinct points, and u t iff {i < n; u ♦p i } ∈ X.
Clearly, the first three conjuncts of Φ are valid in r. The fourth one is also valid: if u i ( (♦ → ♦p i ) ∨ ¬♦p i ), all v > u agree on satisfaction of the formulas ♦p i , thus by definition, also agree on satisfaction of t.
Assume u
and put a j = {i < n; u ♦(♦p i ∧ ♦q j )}. If u < v ♦q j , we have
By definition i ∈ a j iff u ♦(♦p i ∧ ♦q j ). As ϕ holds for a, we thus have u ϕ, which completes the verification of r Φ.
For the converse, assume K, r is an A L -model of Φ, and define
We claim u t iff a(u) := {i < n; u ♦p i } ∈ X for any u of depth 2. Indeed, if u t, then a(u) ∈ X by definition. If u t and a(u) ∈ X, choose u of depth 2 such that a(u ) = a(u), and u t. Let v be a tight predecessor of the set {u, u }.
, which contradicts u ¬t or u t. Let a 0 , . . . , a k−1 be arbitrary subsets of n, we must show that ϕ holds for X and a. By the first three conjuncts of Φ, we may fix pairwise distinct depth-1 points x i p i and y j q j . For each j < k, let z j be a tight predecessor of the set {y j } ∪ {x i ; i ∈ a j }, and let w be a tight predecessor of {z j ; j < k}. For each j, w has exactly one successor satisfying ♦q j , viz. z j . It follows easily
thus w ϕ. As we have w ♦(♦p i ∧ ♦q j ) iff z j ♦p i iff i ∈ a j , and w ♦(t ∧ ♦q j ) iff z j t iff a j = {i; z j ♦p i } ∈ X, this implies ϕ(X, a).
Superintuitionistic logics
The aim of the present subsection is to prove the following theorem. In fact, we will show a slightly stronger result: Theorem 3.4 For any NEXP -language P , there is a polynomial-time function f (w) = α w , δ w such that for every w,
• if w ∈ P , there is a substitution χ such that IPC α w ( χ) and BD 2 δ w ( χ),
• if w / ∈ P , then for every χ such that BD 3 α w ( χ), we have IPC δ w ( χ).
Definition 3.5 For the rest of the subsection, we fix n and
as in lemma 3.1. We define the following formulas in variables p i (i < n), q j (j < k), t, s:
and let α be the conjunction of the formulas
where ϕ is constructed from ϕ as follows. Rewrite ϕ as an equivalent formula using only ∧, ∨, and literals, and replace
Proof: We use the characterization from theorem 1.6. Let X be a witness for the existential quantifier in Φ. We construct an extensible model K by taking n + k leaves, each forcing t, s, and exactly one variable from the list p, q, we add all required tight predecessors (which are bound not to satisfy any p i or q j , by persistence), and for any u which is not a leaf, we put
The first three conjuncts of α are easy to verify, and δ is not valid in the model. Assume (iii): let u ≤ v s. If v t, we are done. Otherwise there is a / ∈ X such that v i∈a (¬p i → t ∧ s) ∧ i / ∈a ¬p i . As a j ∈ X, we have a = a j . If i ∈ a j a, we have v ¬p i ; as u β + i,j , also v (¬p i → t ∧ s) ∨ ¬q j , thus v t ∨ ¬q j . The case i ∈ a a j is similar. (iv) is proved in the same way as (iii), switching t and s.
(Claim 1)
By assumption, ϕ(X, a) holds. As formulas constructed from ∧ and ∨ are monotone, and evaluated in u as in the classical logic, the claim implies u ϕ.
Lemma 3.7 If BD 3 α( χ) and the image of each p i and q j under χ is CPC -consistent, then n ∃X ∀ a = ∅ ϕ(X, a).
Proof: Letψ = ψ( χ) for any ψ. Pick single-element models x i p i and y j q j , and construct a depth-3 modelK by taking x and y as leaves, and attaching tight predecessors to all subsets of depth at most 2. By assumption,K α. Let K be the model on the same frame asK such that K, u ψ iffK, u ψ .
We have K α. Notice that t ∧ s is valid in the leaves of K, but nowhere else, as every other point of K sees at least two leaves, and thus cannot force any p i or q j . Define
Claim 1
The sets X and Y are disjoint.
Proof: Assume for contradiction that a ∈ X ∩ Y , and let u, u be the witnessing points of depth 2 such that u t and u s. Let v be the tight predecessor of {u, u }. We have
as u, u ¬p i (because u, u t ∨ s and u, u ¬p i → t ∧ s), and v is a t.p. of {u, u }. Also
Indeed, if v ≤ w ¬p i , then either v = w, in which case u t ∧ s, contradicting d(u) = 2, or v < w, in which case u ≤ w or u ≤ w, thus w t ∧ s by u, u ¬p i → t ∧ s. Thus, as v α, we get v t ∨ s. This implies u, u t or u, u s, thus u t ∧ s or
Let a 0 , . . . , a k−1 be any nonempty sets, we have to show ϕ(X, a). We have the leaves x i p i and y j q j ; let z j be the tight predecessor of {y j } ∪ {x i ; i ∈ a j }, and w a t.p. of {z j ; j < k}.
Proof: If i ∈ a j , then z j ¬p i → t ∧ s (as z j ¬p i , and everything strictly above z j has depth 1). If i / ∈ a j , then z j ¬p i . By α we get z j t ∨ s. Moreover d(z j ) = 2, thus z j t ∧ s, and either z j t and a j ∈ X, or z j s and a j ∈ Y (thus a j / ∈ X, by claim 1). (i): as w ≤ z j , z j t∨s, and z j ¬p i ∨¬q j , we have w β − i,j . Consider any w ≤ x t∨s. We have x ¬p i → t ∧ s or x ¬p i . In the latter case, we cannot have x ≤ z j , thus either z j ≤ x for some j = j , in which case x ¬q j , or z j < x, in which case x t ∧ s and a fortiori x ¬p i → t ∧ s.
(iii): we have w ≤ z j t, z j ¬q j ∨ s.
(ii) and (iv) are proved similarly to (i) and (iii).
(Claim 2)
We have w i,j (β
, thus w ϕ by α. As formulas built from ∧ and ∨ are monotone, claim 2 implies ϕ(X, a).
Proof (theorem 3.4): By lemma 3.1, there is a polynomial-time function which reduces P to validity of n Φ. WLOG we may further assume n Φ iff n ∃X ∀ a = ∅ ϕ(X, a).
We let f (w) = α, δ as in definition 3.5.
If n Φ, there is a substitution χ such that IPC α( χ) and IPC δ( χ) by lemma 3.6. As δ is a disjunction of negated formulas, each disjunct has a classical (i.e., depth-1) countermodel, and the whole disjunction has a depth-2 countermodel, thus BD 2 δ( χ).
If n Φ and χ is such that BD 3 α( χ), one of the disjuncts of δ( χ) is provable in CPC by lemma 3.7. As the disjuncts are negative, we have IPC δ( χ). Theorem 3.3 gives a simple class of logics for which our method works, but the lower bound is applicable also to other systems. Most importantly, the condition L ⊆ BD 3 excludes logics whose frames have a single top point, such as KC. We note that admissibility in KC is also coNEXP -hard, though we do not know how to generalize the result to, say, all logics contained in KC + BD 4 . Lemma 3.8 Let ϕ(q, p) and ψ(q, p) be ⊥-free formulas with all variables shown, and r a new variable.
, there exists a ⊥-free substitution χ such that IPC ϕ( χ), and IPC ψ( χ).
Proof: (i) is a special case of (ii).
(ii): the right-to-left implication follows from the substitution r → ⊥. Let K, ≤, be an extensible model which validates ϕ i p i ∧ r, p , and refutes ψ i p i ∧ r, p in x ∈ K. Put K = {u ∈ K; u i p i ∧ r}. K is extensible: t.p.'s of nonempty sets exist as K is downwards closed, and the empty set has a t.p. as K x is nonempty. Moreover, K validates ϕ(⊥, p), and K , x ψ(⊥, p).
(iii): take ⊥-free formulas χ such that IPC ϕ( χ(⊥, q)) and IPC ψ( χ(⊥, q)). Then IPC ϕ χ i q i ∧ r, q and IPC ψ χ i q i ∧ r, q by (i).
Proposition 3.9 Admissibility in KC is coNEXP -hard.
, we claim that f is a reduction of IPC -admissibility to KC-admissibility.
If ϕ(⊥, p) | ∼ IP C ψ(⊥, p), then ϕ i p i ∧ r, p | ∼ IP C ψ i p i ∧ r, p by lemma 3.8. As KC admits (single-conclusion) Visser's rules [12] , this implies
, thus there exist ⊥-free formulas χ and such that IPC ϕ i χ i ∧ , χ , and IPC ψ i χ i ∧ , χ . This implies ϕ i p i ∧ r, p | ∼ KC ψ i p i ∧ r, p , because KC has the same ⊥-free fragment as IPC (see [5] ).
Modal logics
Definition 3.10 T is Gödel's translation of IPC in modal logic, adjusted to nonreflexive extensions of K4:
If L is an extension of K4, L is the s.i. logic {ϕ; L T(ϕ)}. For any transitive frame K, its skeleton K is the intuitionistic frame consisting of the clusters of K with the induced ordering relation.
We will transfer the result of the previous subsection to the modal case rather easily, using Gödel's translation. However, we need to formulate the assumptions a bit more carefully; the condition L ⊆ K4BD 3 is too strong (it excludes e.g. S4 and GL), whereas L ⊆ BD 3 seems too weak. The next definition says, roughly, that every depth-3 tree is a skeleton of an Lframe, in which the final clusters are prescribed by the enemy along with the skeleton, but we are free to chose the clusters at depths 2 and 3.
Definition 3.11 Let L be a consistent normal extension of K4. L has the weak depth-3 extension property, if for every finite tree T of depth 3 whose leaves are labeled by finite disjoint clusters validating L, there is an L-frame K such that K T , and the preimage of any leaf of T under the construction is its label.
Notice that we may wlog require all clusters in K of depth 2 and 3 to be singletons, and state the property for arbitrary finite directed graphs of depth 3 instead of trees. Both observations follow as the class of L-frames is closed under p-morphisms.
Lemma 3.12 Let L be a normal extension of K4. If ϕ is L-consistent, it is satisfiable in an L-frame which is a finite cluster.
Proof: If ϕ is consistent with L ⊕ (S5 ∩ (K ⊕ ⊥)) = (L ⊕ S5) ∩ (L ⊕ ⊥), we are done, as all extensions of S5 (Bull [2] ) or K ⊕ ⊥ (trivial) have FMP. If not, there is ψ such that L ψ and S5 ∩ (K ⊕ ⊥) ψ → · ♦¬ϕ. We have
for any α: otherwise ¬α is satisfiable in a finite K4-model, thus in a final cluster, which is a model of S5 ∩ (K ⊕ ⊥).
Therefore K4 · ♦(ψ → · ♦¬ϕ) and L · ♦¬ϕ, a contradiction.
Theorem 3.13
If L is a normal extension of K4 with the weak depth-3 extension property, then admissibility in L is coNEXP -hard.
Proof: Consider the reduction from theorem 3.4. We claim w / ∈ P iff T(α w ) | ∼ L T(δ w ).
If w ∈ P , there is a substitution χ such that IPC α( χ), and BD 2 δ( χ). Then L T(α)(T( χ)) and L T(δ)(T( χ)), as T commutes with substitution (up to K4-provable equivalence), and L ⊆ BD 3 ⊆ BD 2 by the weak depth-3 extension property.
Let χ be a substitution such that L T(α)( χ) and L T(δ)( χ). Putψ = T(ψ)( χ) for any intuitionistic formula ψ. Asδ = i ¬p i ∨ j ¬q j , the formulasp i andq j are L-consistent. As these formulas have the form (. . .), there are finite clusters C i p i and D j q j validating L, by lemma 3.12. By the weak depth-3 extension property, there is an L-model K of depth 3 which has C and D as its final clusters, and contains a tight predecessor (either reflexive or irreflexive) for every subset of depth at most 2. By assumption, K α. Define a valuation on K by [u] ψ iff u ψ . Then K is a model of the form considered in the proof of lemma 3.7, thus by the same argument, n Φ and w / ∈ P . The T translation is not in general polynomial-time: expanding each subformula ϕ = ϕ ∧ ϕ doubles the size, thus the length of T(ϕ) is exponential in the implication-depth of ϕ. However, our α and δ from definition 3.5 have constant depth (4), which takes care of the problem. (In fact, it is easy to see that any rule can be transformed into a polynomially longer rule involving only formulas of depth 2, while preserving its (non)admissibility.) Corollary 3.14 Admissibility in any extensible finitely axiomatizable cofinal subframe logic is coNEXP -complete.
Notice that the constant 3 in theorem 3.13 is tight: L = GL + 2 ⊥ has the depth-2 extension property, yet by proposition 2.7, L-admissibility is not coNEXP -hard (unless NEXP , including the polynomial-time hierarchy, collapses to Σ P 3 = Π P 3 ). In fact, we have the following characterization, which illustrates the dependence of complexity of admissibility on depth. Notice that derivability in any of the logics GL + m ⊥ is coNP -complete. Proof: (i): GL + ⊥ is an inessential variant of CPC .
(iii) follows from theorem 3.2.
(ii): A L ∈ Π P 3 by proposition 2.7. We can reduce validity of Σ q 3 quantified Boolean formulas to L-nonadmissibility as in the proof of theorem 3.2, using tight predecessors to simulate universal quantifiers. Details are left to the interested reader.
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